(Secret outside the department.)
(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #418[a].

I am sending the following information for your reference. 1. Condition of Quartering Troops.

(a) Saigon and its vicinity. Despite the negotiations carried on locally, they refuse absolutely to allow the Japanese to use some of the barracks and houses belonging to French Indo-China, merely permitting the use of-----of Annamites, and they are quartered in a limited space with two persons per one "tsubo"[b] and despite the fact that for the present----------hundred

[A-509]

thousand "tsubo" is necessary (please keep this matter strictly secret from the other side), they have not offered us the use of the warehouses of the French Army and----------under French management. We have rented and are using only the rice warehouses belonging to the Chinese and situated in one section of the race track.

At Konota[c] and Natoran[c] the quarters are provided in barracks and school buildings. At Kamuran the quarters are very much limited because there are no buildings. At Kacusanjakku[c] our barracks----------. At Baria[c] the troops are camping here and there because there are no buildings. At Punopen[c] and Sienhreapu[c] the quarters are extremely narrow.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[a] See III, 1001.
[b] Approximately 6 ft. square.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9-29-41

(Part 2 of 2.)

2. The French Indo-China authorities have requested that a detailed agreement be concluded regarding joint defense. They would like to have the French Indo-China forces be responsible for the border regions facing China and Thailand and have the Japanese forces be responsible for the remaining areas. It seems that the French Indo-China forces are anxious not to provoke the Chinese Army. However, it is our desire that this matter be arranged in detail between the Japanese and the French Indo-China Armies (please keep this strictly secret and only to yourself).

3. Inasmuch as facilities at airports and barracks are concerned, this question logically comes within matters which should be settled locally, and so we have no intention of negotiating it. We have already referred this matter, together with the purport of paragraph 2 above, to the local army. Should the French authorities approach you with anything in the nature of a protest regarding these questions, do not heed them, but after suitability replying to them, arrange to have them handled as questions to be settled between the armies. http://www.bebo.com/LouisS205

4. Furthermore, in order to assist in these negotiations, I am arranging to have Finance official YUMOTO go to your city from Berlin, and so have him cooperate with you as much as possible as soon as he arrives.

Trans. 9-29-41

According to a conversation between a member of the German Embassy in Paris and a member of our staff, the French Government, since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, has offered various suggestions for the revision of the terms of the armistice. So far as Germany is concerned, they are confident regarding the outcome of the German-Soviet war, and they feel no anxiety regarding the coming war with England. So far as it does not interfere in military

[A-510]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

affairs, the progress of Franco-German cooperation is a thing to be desired, and the preliminary machinations have been begun for creating such an atmosphere of cooperation.

Furthermore, the matter of maintaining general peace in the occupied area is hardly a problem any more. The impression that our official received was that as a result of the outbreak of the Russo-German war, German military force in the occupied areas in general has been increased more or less.

Trans. 9-25-41

Re my #510.[a]

I made representations along the line you laid down, however, on the 22nd Akunaru[b] told Harada that Saigon had made inquiry of the Tokyo Specie Bank on the 9th regarding the problem of the disposition of the August allotment of free yen, but had received no reply as yet, and hence until they could see their way through the problem, they were not prepared to accept our proposal of paying 1
3 contained in my caption message, part (3).

Inasmuch as a decision on the September allotment is urgent, there is no other way than for us to accept one of the French proposals contained in my caption message, I believe.

[a] Not available.
[b] Arnold of Vichy Foreign Office.

Trans. 9-25-41

Re your #471[a].

On the 24th, I saw Vice-Premier DARLAN and requested the payment of 66,000,000 piastres as this year's supplementary payment for the expense of the Japanese army in French Indo-China (for his reference, I gave him the gist of the request in writing). DARLAN said that he understood that we wanted the French Government to lend the money temporarily, and so I replied that we, of course, intended to repay the sum advanced by means of gold, the free yen, or foreign currency. I then explained that the payment of the 23,000,000 piastres, which is the amount for September and October, required immediate decision. DARLAN understood this, and after calling Vice-Minister ROSIA, immediately got in touch with the offices concerned and ordered-----. http://www.bebo.com/LouisS205

I had HARADA at once negotiate the details.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-26-41

[A-511]

Your #536[a], my #427[b] replied to the matters in your message.

We will transmit a concrete proposal for method of payment in a follow-up message. Details can be negotiated later, impress upon the French the urgency of negotiating this matter.

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-8-41

Re my #515[a].

On the 22nd HARADA again explained to ARNALD that we are already in contact with the Germans in Berlin and Paris on this question. ARNALD, however, expressed quite a few grievances on the part of France saying that our exports to French Indo-China were not proceeding as well as might be expected; that the various methods of payment were unreliable; and that in case she could not export to the United States, France would prefer to stock surpluses. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

As I have told you in a number of messages the main difficulty concerning our occupation expenses, methods of payment, and the matter in question seems to be in the manner in which the economic treaty is at present being carried out. That seems to be the impression here. I want you, therefore, please to inform me by return wire the present state of affairs and the prospects for the future.

Relayed to Berlin.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-26-41

During my conversation mentioned in my #526,[a] DARLAN said that he had recently gotten some very unsatisfactory reports from French Indo-China. He said that, therefore, he would like for Ambassador YOSHIZAWA to take up his post at the earliest possible moment.

I should like to know just when the Ambassador will start for his office. Please wire me back.

[a] See III, 1008.

Trans. 9-26-41

[A-512]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(To be kept a department secret.)

Re your #422.[a]

At the time of our conversation mentioned in my #526,[b] I referred to the matter in question, and DARLAN said, "No, it is all news to me, and I cannot believe it, I assure you. Some time ago on the occasion of the conclusion of the Tokyo-Bangkok agreement, American Ambassador LEAHY came and said, 'I have received instructions from my home government and wish to inform you that the Government of the United States is displeased with the pact in question.' I replied, 'Well, we are taking this action, having considered the respective positions of both Japan and France with reference to French Indo-China, and I want to ask you please to stay out of this affair.'

"I am sure that we could have gained nothing whatever by resisting Germany in Europe and, similarly, there would be no point in our wrangling with Japan in the Far East. This is my conviction, for I do not see how you could suspect us of trying to get the United States to intervene in this sort of matter. Besides, what could the United States do?"  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[a] See III, 998.
[b] See III, 1008.

Trans. 10-7-41

The troops of occupation in northern French Indo-China continually asked the French Indo-China officials to transfer to Haiphong some 60,000 railroad ties that were in the neighborhood of Langson near the Chinese border north of Bandoeng. They did nothing about this, and finally we decided that the only thing to do was to seize the railway between Bandoeng and Haiphong temporarily by force and change these ties ourselves. We made ready, and the army approved our measures, declaring that obviously the French officials were not cooperating with us. Finally, on the 29th, we began the shipments.

Trans. 10-4-41