No. 360

  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Moscow

7 May 1941

# 954.

In view of the attitude of the United States, it is urgent to adjust our relations with U.S.S.R. We are doing everything we can at this end toward that goal. We trust you will do likewise at your end.http://Louissheehan.BraveDiary.com

Trans. 5-9-41

No. 361

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

7 May 1941

No number.

Action Moscow as # 455.

Please report internal and external circumstances regarding Stalin's assumption of Chairmanship of the Council of Peoples Commissar, and possible effects and opinions regarding same.

Trans. 5-8-41

No. 362

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

7 May 1941

No number.

Received from Moscow as # 549.

Stalin's assumption of Chairmanship of Council of People's Commissar, and Molotov's appointment to Vice-Premiership and Commissar of Foreign Affairs, no doubt, will have a far-reaching effect in view of the times. The following is our general evaluation of the above situation:

In view of the present complicated world situation, Stalin has decided to assume the leadership in politics and internal affairs, and to let Molotov assume the full direction of foreign policy. In foreign affairs, it probably can be said that Stalin, profiting by the example of German and Italian dictators, intends personally to participate in direct dealings with foreign powers, whenever necessary.

As regards internal affairs, despite his assumption of Premiership, Stalin will no doubt retain his position as the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, thus achieving the vast leadership, for the first time, since it was held by Lenin. Furthermore, considering the fact that in the past the Premiership has traditionally been held by men from Greater Russia, and that Stalin is a Georgean, it indicates that Stalin has come to feel, after deep deliberation, that the time is ripe for him to participate openly in internal affairs. (His advocacy of the principle of Greater Russianism and Greater Russian language, since the beginning of the present European War, can be considered as long-range, deeply laid preparatory plan for the present assumption of power).

On the other hand, the delegation of full direction of foreign policy to Molotov may certainly be attributed to present complex European situations, at the same time it may be Stalin's scheme, in view of the recent trend in German-Soviet relations, to make Molotov solely responsible for its future developments, so that should a hitch develop in the German-Soviet relations,

Page A-188

Stalin may dispose of Molotov with dispatch. Even if we accept this assumption for whatever it is worth, it appears from the fact that he had been demoted to vice-premiership, and that his wife was recently severely criticized at the party conference, that Molotov's star is declining, and already we hear the name of WISINSUKI mentioned as successor to Molotov.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 363

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

7 May 1941

# 378.

Regarding my message to Moscow # 455 [a].

Please obtain Ribbentrop's opinion on this matter. Relayed to Moscow.

[a] See I, 361. Re Stalin's assumption of Chairmanship of the Council of Peoples Commissar.

Trans. 5-8-41

No. 364

FROM: Berlin

TO: Tokyo

9 May 1941

# 510.

On the occasion of my conversations which I reported to you in my message # 506 [a], I said that it is generally believed that preparations being made by Germany for war with the U.S.S.R. was for the purpose of showing the U.S.S.R. the military might of Germany, with which Germany expected to get some concessions. I added that I would like to hear his opinion on the matter.

He replied that at present no one could predict whether or not matters would develop so far as to bring about a German-U.S.S.R. war. However, he could say that Germany was not engaged in any demonstrated bluff.

I, therefore, said that I hoped he would let me know in advance if Germany decides to fight Russia. I assured him that we would guard the secret very strictly.

(I have related this matter to both the military and naval attaché).

[a] Not available.

Trans. 5-26-41

No. 365

FROM: Berlin (Oshima)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

9 May 1941

# 507.

Stalin's assumption of the Chairmanship of the Council of Peoples' Commissar, is for the existing emergency. Stalin's holding the three branches of the government, political, military, and internal, is, as is generally observed, for the purpose of demonstrating the functions in view of the political conditions at the present. However, the reason for this having taken place suddenly at this time is no doubt due to international complications in general and to Soviet

Page A-189

German relations in particular. If we assume for instance that Germany is about to make the greatest demands on the Soviet since the outbreak of the war, due to necessity, it is quite probable that Russia may be forced to make some great concession to Germany then it may have been necessary for Stalin to have established his leadership in name as well as in fact in order that he might better control the internal situation. However we view it, the Soviet has made preparations for an important turning point in their policy.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. 366

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

April 16, 1941

# 418.

Part 1 of 4.

Re my # 413 [a].

There follow the results of a conference between Vice Admiral NOMURA, the military and naval attaches and myself. I humbly submit the following views:

1. It would seem that, depending upon how the Soviet acts, Germany is planning to attack her, or that some hitch has occurred in Germany's battle against Britain. It would seem that perhaps Germany is planning first to defeat the Soviet, secure the rich stores of Russian raw materials and, thus having fortified herself, to attack England later. As I have wired you from time to time, Germany had completed all her submarine, raiding and invasion plans to overthrow England. Vice Admiral NOMURA and the naval officers under him confirm that all preparations had been made for the war in the west. Looking at the matter without bias, it would seem that Germany is considering such matters as assistance from the United States to England and probably considers that this will be a hindrance to her success. It would seem that perhaps Germany is losing confidence in the possibility of defeating the British Isles, or that perhaps she fears that the war would drag out too long to her disadvantage, and that finally she might never get a chance to give the Soviet the blow she desires to deliver. In any case, German-Soviet relations have suddenly cooled. During Germany's Balkan endeavors the Soviet did all she could to thwart the Reich, and Germany is losing all confidence in the Soviet's good faith. This is clear from the statements of Chancellor HITLER and those near him.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 4-29-41

No. 367

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

April 16, 1941

# 418.

Part 2 of 4.

However, if paralleling her attack on England, Germany undertakes a war against the Soviet, she will have to fight on two fronts and this will broaden the scope of the war tremendously. However, since the beginning of this war Germany has gained much experience and with an army in the neighborhood of 250 divisions of highly mechanized troops she could maintain a tremendous superiority over the Red army. Furthermore, since she is fighting

Page A-190

England in the air she would not need her land forces in the west. The Soviet air arm is long outmoded and Germany has in the neighborhood of 20,000 planes of the latest model. Furthermore, she will use her submarines in the war on England and they, together with the airplanes, will enable Germany while maintaining superiority over Britain, at the same time to undertake a campaign against Russia. After mopping up in Yugoslavia, Germany can turn her attention to the war in Africa and to bringing the African peoples into line. In this she already appears to be succeeding to a certain extent. After gaining such military and political successes, Germany can hardly afford to lose this opportunity. She cannot wait until the Soviet is better prepared. The Soviet has long been her enemy and Germany realizes that she must fight her. However, everyone generally agrees that she had better fight soon because it would be more difficult to wage war in Russia during the winter time.

You have only to observe HITLER's way of doing things to understand what he is likely to do. Before the events of year before last not only did I hear from high military sources what was going to happen but I already guessed it. Germany judges that conditions in the Soviet are very unsettled and beyond any doubt the German military officials consider that their chances are excellent to defeat the Soviet.

Trans. 4-29-41

No. 368

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

April 16, 1941

# 418.

Part 3 of 4.

2. When we observe HITLER's leadership in the present war, on the one hand we can see that he does not say what he is going to do before he does it, and on the other hand, needless to say, he carefully weighs everything. Before he would venture into a war with the Soviet, he would carefully lay both military and political plans. First, Germany would scheme to obtain land on the Soviet border. She would likely bring the Ukraine and the Caucasus under her control. Probably such plans are already afoot. If the German army defeated the Red army it would be beyond saying into what state Soviet intra-national affairs would fall and what a catastrophe it would be to the STALIN regime. Even if the STALIN regime continued, needless to say, its influence would be nullified.

Well, you know what pressure the Soviet has always brought to bear upon us in the north and, if the Germans defeat the Russians, the pressure which London and Moscow have been bringing to bear upon us would automatically vanish.

England and the United States both hope that the war will be extended through a German-Russian struggle. They would both rejoice over that and endeavor to assist the Soviet, but in the end England, and the United States too, would not really be able to afford STALIN very much assistance. Nor would their puny efforts have much effect on the outcome of such a struggle.

Trans. 4-29-41

Page A-191

No. 369

FROM: Berlin (Osima)  

TO: Tokyo

April 16, 1941

# 418.

Part 4 of 4.

3. In case Germany and Russia go to war, of course we might revive our one time anti-Communistic national policy, but now that we have concluded a neutrality treaty with Moscow and inasmuch as Germany is confident that she can whip the Russians, I do not think that she expects us to make a simultaneous attack on them. I think that all Germany would desire would be that we keep our soldiers and military establishments intact in Northern Manchukuo to prevent Russian soldiers in that area from being transferred to the scene of the conflict. I think that would satisfy the Germans. I further consider that what Germany would most wish would be rather that we restrain England and the United States by our policy in the South Seas. In any case, it is clear that there is no need for us to parallel every act of Germany. Still, from the point of view of our own best interests, I think that we should carefully choose our time and attack from the north. The first thing we wish to do is to definitely establish our sovereignty over Greater East Asia. Now, Anglo-American influence in the Far East, centering around Singapore, is a threat and a menace to this. Therefore, it is absolutely essential presently to seize that city. The European situation is marching to a climax at high speed. Germany has seized the Eastern Mediterranean and is about to plant the Swastika at the Suez and in the Near East. The British Mediterranean Fleet may never return home but may rather proceed to the Far East to protect Britain's colonies, where England may expect to transfer her influence. I would not say there is no danger of that. So far as the continent of Europe is concerned, England is already out. Furthermore, the odds are twenty to one against a war between Japan and Russia. This will have a tremendous effect on America's pressure in the Far East. Furthermore, in case war actually does not break between Germany and Russia,  this is fine from the point of view of our plans and may give us excellent opportunities.

 What we advise is that you immediately adopt the above described plans as our national policy and as soon as you have gotten a sufficient understanding with Germany and Italy to  carry it out and as soon as we have the means, to apply ourselves to action.

 This and my caption message are the only messages being sent. The Military and Naval Attaches are not sending them. Therefore, will you please communicate their contents to the Ministers of War and Navy. I want again to impress upon you the great importance of keeping secret my caption message and letting no leaks occur.

Trans. 4-29-41

No. 370

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

April 24, 1941

# 456.

 Part 2 of 2 [a].

4. I said: "I can well understand how you can divide your forces up so as to let the Navy fight England and the Army fight Russia, but I cannot quite see how you can have enough airplanes to fight in both the east and the west at the same time."

 He replied: "In answer to your question let me explain that in numbers too the German air force is preeminent. We have plenty of planes for both areas. In our attack on London on the night of the 16th we used 646 planes. On the night of the 17th we had planned to use 760 planes

Page A-192

but the weather got bad during the night and we used only 400. Nevertheless, their effect was great. We have more planes than we have ever brought into use and we can increase the number in action, but naturally there is a limit. We would fight in the east without curtailing the number of planes necessary for our attack on Great Britain.

5. Summing all this up, Germany is fairly confident that she can defeat the Soviet and she is preparing to fight the Soviet at any moment, I think. The question as to whether Germany will fight or compromise with Russia will be settled by Chancellor HITLER alone and no man can say today just what will happen, but in any case it is up to us to get ready and lay our plans for whatever takes place. Will you please prepare a counter policy?

I have conferred with the Military and Naval Attaches on this message.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 4-29-41

No. 371

FROM: Stockholm (Koda)

TO: (Gaimudaijin), Tokyo

13 April 1941

# 042.

Part 1 of 2. Part 2 not available.

According to intelligence, Germany is forcing the suppression of anti-German newspaper articles in (Sweden?) and (Finland?). At the same time German agents are exceedingly busy in those two countries, and in general it may be said that the Germans are following a very aggressive policy against these two countries.

It is said that the cause for this policy is to beat the U.S.S.R. to it, if she attempts to do anything. It is further reported that the Germans have made considerable inroads into the government circles of Finland.

The Finnish government has suddenly ordered many Finnish civilians and 26 members of the diplomatic corps who allegedly have pro-British leanings, to return.

It is believed that this was motivated by the Germans.

Trans. 5-2-41

No. 372

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

April 24, 1941

# 457.

Part 1 of 2.

1. When the non-aggression treaty was concluded both Berlin and Moscow agreed in principle that the border line as of 1914 should be recognized and when a division of populations took place it was done fairly harmoniously; but, in view of the result of the German-Polish war, Germany came to demand the maintenance of a line further to the east. Russia declared that if she recognized this she would have to annex the three Baltic nations and, on the terms that she be allowed a sufficient length of time to evacuate German residents of those three nations, Germany recognized the Soviet claim. That was when Berlin and Moscow concluded their commercial pact year before last and for a time Berlin-Moscow relations were growing more intimate.

2. Although there had been no understanding or conversation between Berlin and Moscow concerning the invasion of Finland, seeing how Russia had gone ahead and taken this ter-

Page A-193

ritory, Germany in order to keep on good terms with Moscow recognized this as the restoration of an old dependency. Moscow, furthermore, guaranteed the continuance of Finland as such and while she was not particularly pleased with it, Berlin did not make a single demand and maintained neutrality; but it is now clear that Germany does not intend to lose her foothold in Finland. Germany wants to establish a new order in Europe in which she wants Finland included. Therefore, she has lately been spreading cultural propaganda in that country, much to the dissatisfaction of the Soviet. Consequently, for a week or so the Soviet has been instigating demonstrations in Finland and Germany is none too happy over this course of events.

Trans. 4-29-41

No. 373

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

April 24, 1941

# 457.

Part 2 of 2.

3. When the commercial pact was concluded Russia already had her eyes on Bessarabia but, in order to prevent a Balkan flare-up, she satisfied herself with assurances from Germany that she would get this territory after the war. Last year, however, the Soviet suddenly seized Bessarabia and annexed Bukovina. This infuriated Germany. So last year under duress from Germany, Romania gave up territory to Yugoslavia and Hungary; and Germany, Italy, Romania and Hungary got together on counter Russian policy.

4. In spite of this state of affairs, last autumn MOLOTOV visited Berlin. Up to that time German-Soviet relations could not be said to have grown particularly bad and at the time RIBBENTROP hoped to draw the Kremlin into the Three Power Alliance. In spite of Germany's eloquent solicitation, MOLOTOV would give no clear reply. The final Soviet answer did state that, in return for guaranteeing Germany's rights in Finland, her special position and rights in Bulgaria would have to be recognized by Germany. Germany said no and without consulting Moscow began to lay her Balkan schemes. Consequently, when Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Treaty, the Kremlin issued an unfriendly communiqué and formed a non-aggression pact with Turkey. When Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Alliance, Russia railed at her.

Trans. 4-29-41

No. 374

FROM: Rome

TO: Tokyo

13 May 1941

# 271.

From Ambassador Osima.

On the 12th Ambassador Horikiri and I called on Mussolini. During our conversation, which lasted about one hour, (Ciano being present), Mussolini earnestly inquired about Japan's domestic affairs and particularly concerning Japan's desire for friendly relations with America and Britain. He then explained to us that there is absolutely no disharmony between Italy and Germany and that he has faith in the favorable outcome of the present war.

Trans. 5-17-41

Page A-194

No. 375

FROM: Rome

TO: Tokyo

May 2, 1941

# 255.

Part 1 of 2. Strictly secret.

The opinions here in regard to the developments of the war are as follows:

1. German-Italian relations are said to be growing closer and closer as the war develops and at the same time Italy has contributed much toward the Balkan and African campaigns. In contributing toward an Axis victory, there has been not a little supervision at home and abroad. Though that position will have its advantages, Germany, following the wise plans of Chancellor Hitler, is endeavoring to preserve the integrity of Italy and, in order that she not show a parsimonious attitude in heeding Germany's demand, is gradually softening the profound antipathy of the Italian people toward German political strength. As a result of Germany's cultural schemes exercised without regret, there is a gradual strengthening of confidence toward Germany among the Italian people. However, it is a fact that in all matters pertaining to Italian foreign policy she respects the opinions of Germany. Plans for Italo-German ----- will not be conducted long. There are not a few who have misgivings about Italy's future in view of Germany's strong position of power at the conclusion of this war and especially the Fascist Young Men's Party have not committed themselves as to whether they will continue for long under the present situation of complete cooperation with Germany in future German-Italian relations unless independent Italistic imperial rule is maintained.

2. It would seem that the rapid expansion of the war by Germany and Italy in the Balkan and North African areas has had much effect upon strengthening the position of Isolationists in the United States. The attitude of the United States Government, too, would seem to be one of profound indecision. President ROOSEVELT's plan for aid to Britain have not changed and his forthright way of doing things will become more and more unceremonious, but she will not participate in the war. The fact is, however, the situation will become the same as through she were participating in the war. This country, similar to Germany, is doing her utmost to prevent war with the United States, but, in view of the attitude of America, as I have explained it, Germany and Italy are preparing for a long-time war and it would seem that she is hurrying her preparations for such an eventuality. In the light of this, in order to settle the Near East and Eastern Mediterranean questions, Germany will shortly demand of Turkey that she permit the passage of troops and, at the same time that she occupies the various important islands of the Aegean Sea, she will proceed with her operations aimed at the Suez and the Iraqi oil fields. Germany and Italy are stepping up their bombing of Malta. On one hand she is working toward the invasion of Egypt from Libya. It is being said that already Italian troops dispatched to the Libyan area are being sent to the African front. Germany, too, it seems is reinforcing her mechanized forces.

Part 2 of 2. Strictly secret.

3. Paralleling these military developments, Germany plans to prevent England and America from using Northwest Africa as a base and with the objective of French territorial Morocco and Seuta, she is endeavoring to penetrate into Spain. Spain at the present time on the face of things is maintaining a neutral attitude but Germany is exerting great determination. At this pass should Spain incline toward the Axis, American troops will be landed in Portugal and, using this area as a base, she might pass through in attack. As for ourselves, too, I believe that it would be wise to investigate steps with respect to Timor in comparing this with our general plan for southward penetration.

Page A-195

4. In regard to landing operations against the British homeland, looking at it from here it does not appear that Germany must immediately carry this out. There is also the question of relations with the Soviet. Thus reducing sacrifices to a minimum she will achieve success by waiting patiently for the arrival of the opportunity and then taking a decisive action. For the present Germany plans to reduce Britain's power of resistance, principally through the use of bombings and submarine warfare.

5. With respect to Soviet relations, it would seem that she were endorsing the strong attitude of Germany, and though she is sending out various types of propaganda, whether it is aimed at restraining the Soviet in order to ----- the attitude of the Allies of whether it is with a view of alienating Germany and the Soviet, it would be hard to say. ----- ----- ----- ----- I think that there is no reason for Germany and Italy to worry about the Soviet.

Trans. 5-7-41

No. 376

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Moscow

19 March 1941

# 286.

Originated Berlin, to Tokyo as # 271 on 17 March.

After the informal dinner for Admiral Raeder, we held a discussion, the gist of which follows:

1. The Admiral expressed his utmost confidence that the submarines would carry out their part of the attack of England proper. He expressed his regrets however that his surface vessels were of an inferior quality. Unlike the World War of 1914-18, this time Germany has established numerous excellent naval bases extending all the way from the North Sea to the Atlantic. If Germany had the naval fleet she had during the last war, landing operations would be a very simple matter.

In spite of the excellence of the air force, he continued, it could not be expected to completely replace the navy and carry out all of the duties customarily assigned to a navy. The greatest problem that faces Germany today, he said, is the means with which to carry out landing operations.

I, therefore, asked him ----- (30 groups missed here) ----- the first step would be, he replied, to establish a (blockading?) line between Sicily and (Tunisia?). This point was discussed at the recent Milan conference, and the Italian naval high command expressed their agreement to it.

2. Admiral Raeder expressed his desire for a Japanese attack on Singapore. I, therefore, replied along the same lines used recently in replies to Hitler and Ribbentrop.

Trans. 3-25-41

No. 377

FROM: Berlin

TO: Tokyo

May 6, 1941

# 491.

Part 1 of 2

On the 6th a certain authoritative German told a staff member of mine the following:

"1. The Iraqi uprising was a little earlier than Germany anticipated and she has some misgivings as to whether Iraq can hold out until she is able to give beneficial aid. Under the present circumstances, Germany, greatly concerned, is taking steps to closely watch the developments

Page A-196

of the situation. Recently Germany undertook to ship through Turkey planes and anti-aircraft guns for Iraq but not a single person was sent at that time.

"2. With respect to Turkey, the facts are that the situation there has definitely been clarified. In the very secret conversations between Turkey's president and Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP (he said that these conversations took place in Sofia during the early part of April) it was decided that Turkey would participate in the partitioning of Greece. A part of eastern Macedonia and two islands close to Turkey in the Aegean Sea would be assured her. Furthermore, a plan was evolved whereby Turkey would keep in line with the establishment of the new order under Axis domination and that within about two weeks, together with Croatia, she would participate in the Tri-Partite Agreement. It was expected that German troops, munitions, etc., will be permitted passage through that country.

Part 2 of 2.

"3. The Soviet, unchangingly maintaining a position of assiduously regarding Germany's opinions, is even supplying goods without interruption and there have been no startling developments recently. However, Germany is gradually stepping up her preparations for war against the Soviet and this will be completed during May, but the decision as to whether or not she actually makes war on the Soviet lies entirely with Chancellor HITLER and it would be hard for any Foreign Office official to make any predictions.

"4. In connection with the partitioning of Yugoslavia, Germany will accede to all of Italy's insistences as I have told you before. Aside from Montenegro becoming a protectorate of Italy, Croatia, too, will be sent a sovereign from the Italian imperial line and will come under the control of Italy. The clearing up of the eastern Mediterranean will be left up to Italy.

"5. Though there are various opinions with regard to America's participation in the war, it is generally felt that the chances are becoming greater and greater. In the event of the United States' entering upon a convoy system, Germany at that time will deal her a telling blow by bombing attacks and submarine warfare. Recently the submarine warfare against England has slightly abated, but this has been brought about because of various preparations necessitated by the possibility of American convoying."

Trans. 5-8-41

No. 378

FROM: Vienna (Yamaji)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

9 May 1941

# 039.

(Abstract)

Summary of reports indicate that:

In preparation for a long drawn out war and successful termination of her Near Eastern campaign, Germany will take over the grain fields of Ukraine and Caucasus as soon as the harvest is ready. This means war with U.S.S.R. about June.

Trans. 5-24-41

Page A-197

No. 379

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: Tokyo

12 May 1941

Commerce # 73.

Re your Commerce Circular # 1049 [a].

Regarding this question, I had a conference with MIKOYAN [b] on the 9th. I asked him if there was under consideration any new German-Soviet plan for collaboration. After a slight hesitation he replied that there was no such thing being carried on.

[a] Not available.

[b] Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan—Peoples' Commissar for Food Industry.

Trans. Not dated

No. 380

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

TO: Tokyo

May 12, 1941

# 520.

1. DNB and other agencies, without giving details, send in articles and editorials appearing in our newspapers and the German authorities are becoming rather alarmed. Every time they receive something which displeases them because they consider it disadvantageous or delicate, referring to German-Soviet relations (for example, the article published by the Roochi on May 5th and the article about Iraq in the Kokumin of the 3rd), they come to me and complain. Well, all I can do is explain to them the difference between our way of doing this and the German way of doing things so far as the press is concerned.

2. Through a most rigorous control of the press, Germany suppresses all reports unfavorable to Japan. Not only that but she follows a policy of treating everything concerning Russia with silent contempt and the tendency is to make as little reference thereto as possible. When STALIN assumed the Premiership of the Soviet, you would be surprised at what tiny reports appeared in the German papers concerning this.

3. Please take note of the above facts and see that the press is given better guidance hereafter.

Trans. 5-21-41

No. 381

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

15 February 1941

# 070.

In 3 parts—complete.

Action London as # 47.

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs is rather surprised to learn an attitude of undue concern on the part of His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs which is no doubt based upon information emanating from the British Embassy in Tokyo and other sources. There is of course no way to ascertain what kind of information the British government have been receiving but the Minister of Foreign Affairs would like to avail himself of this opportunity to state that so far as he can see there is no ground for entertaining alarming views on the situation in East Asia. On more than one occasion the Minister

Page A-198

of Foreign Affairs explained to the British Ambassador in Tokyo and even to the public at large that one of the primary purposes of the Tripartite Pact is to limit the sphere of the European war by preventing those powers not engaged in hostilities at present from entering the war and also to bring about its termination as quickly as possible. The Japanese government has not so far found any reason or occasion to alter this avowed aim which constitutes a fundamental basis of their policy. The British government may rest assured on this point.

However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs feels that he owes it to candor to say that he cannot help entertaining a certain amount of anxiety, if not misgivings, as to the movements of the British and American governments in their attempt to expedite and enlarge warlike preparations with an eye to meeting supposed contingencies in the Pacific and the South Seas. Press reports about these movements originating from American sources and elsewhere are causing increasing misgivings in Japan with the consequence that in some quarters it is contended that Japan should lose no time in taking measures to meet the worst eventuality in these regions.

The concern felt is rather natural in the face of these disturbing reports. If the American government could only be persuaded to restrict their activities in this respect to the Western Hemisphere, prudently avoiding to cause anxiety unnecessarily in the minds of Japanese, the situation would indeed be very much mitigated.

Having had the privilege of forming personal acquaintanceship at Geneva with His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs and prompted by the belief that an exchange of frank views in a general way at this juncture will be of some service in enabling the two peoples to see eye to eye, the Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to take the liberty of making further observations. http://Louissheehan.BraveDiary.comThe uppermost thought in his mind has always been the world peace. He sincerely hopes that on the one hand, the China Affair will be brought to an end as soon as possible and on the other, the European war will see an early termination. It is his earnest and constant prayer that the powers may gather again to discuss at a round table their differences and disputes and deliberate on the great question of organizing an enduring peace upon a just and equitable world order. In this connection, he desires to assure his eminent colleague that far from aspiring to control the destinies of, and to dominate other peoples, it is Japan's established policy to inaugurate an era of peace and plenty and of mutual helpfulness of greater East Asia by promoting the spirit of concord and conciliation. As repeatedly affirmed, Japan's motto is "no conquest, no exploitation". He, therefore, strongly deprecates those biased reports designed to calumniate Japan.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs confesses his utter inability to see any good purpose served by prolonging the war whatever the motive. Whatever the outcome, whoever the victor, there are present in every European, if not the world situation, elements of a great danger to face a fearful spectacle of chaos and confusion, possibly eventuating in the downfall of modern civilization. It takes statesmanship of a high order to foresee and meet in time a catastrophic contingency.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has not lost hope yet that such statesmanship will not be wanting in the British Empire. Lastly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs would like to make it clear that Japan, deeply concerned as she is with an early restoration of peace, is fully prepared to act as a mediator or to take whatever action calculated to revive normal conditions, not only in Greater East Asia but anywhere the world over. The Minister for Foreign Affairs trusts that his Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs will not hesitate to share the conviction that upon the shoulders of the leading powers rest the great and grave responsibility of restoring peace and saving modern civilization from an impending collapse. Such responsibility can only be fulfilled by a wise and courageous statesmanship willing to

Page A-199

display an accommodating and generous position listening to other's claims and contentions. It is hardly necessary to add that whatever Japan may do she will always be actuated by the consciousness of responsibility which she owes to humanity.

Trans. 2-19-41

No. 382

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington

February 18, 1941

# 79.

Message to London as # 52. Part 1 of 2.

Secret outside the Department.

Re my # 51 [a].

1. As a result of an investigation made by us, it seems that incendiary reports have been wired in succession to the home country ever since early this month from Tokyo, Singapore (Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet), French Indo-China, Thailand, Shanghai, and Hongkong, as well as from certain parts of Europe to the effect that Japan, timing her move with Germany's Spring drive, would shortly commence military action towards the south and so the situation in the Far East had become suddenly critical. It seems that England, who now stands in fear of a German invasion, tying up these reports with the conference for mediation at present being held in Tokyo, (Britain seems to think that Japan is demanding an opportunity to advance for the purpose of attacking Singapore), had hastily concluded that Japan, urged on by Germany and Italy, is about to take aggressive action and advance southward. Thus England seems to have been greatly shocked. As a result, she decided to make her last appeal to us for the purpose of warning us, and that is why on the 7th a protest was submitted to you. But, as you already know from my # 46 [b] and # 51 [a], we have no intention of initiating a conflict with Great Britain and the United States. Furthermore, I found by  examining the translations, which Ambassador CRAIGIE' brought to me on the 15th, of the replies made by the Prime Minister and by me in the Diet (referred to in your # 104 [a]) that, of much mistranslation and misunderstanding, Great Britain from the very beginning had not been receiving accurate reports regarding our real intentions, and so I called Ambassador CRAIGIE's attention to this fact and CRAIGIE has come to understand the situation.

[a] Not used.

[b] Not used.

[c] British Ambassador to Tokyo.

[d] Not available.

Trans. 2-20-41

No. 383

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington

February 18, 1941

# 79.

Message to London as # 52. Part 2 of 2.

2. At the same time and in connection with the above, the United States Government also seems to have been receiving reports that are, in the main, of the same nature. The American authorities are hastening the withdrawal of her nationals from Japan just as the United States

Page A-200

(?) and Australia have been doing. It goes without saying that Great Britain and the United States are attempting to restrain us by working together. The reason for the British newspapers writing up the approaching crisis in the Far East is that by so doing Great Britain is trying to lead the United States to interfere with Far Eastern affairs and Great Britain actually is planning to have the United States act as a front in maintaining the status quo in the Netherlands Indies. To be sure, at the military conference between the United States, and Great Britain, which is being held at present in Washington and which is an aspect of this situation, the United States, according to reports, has not yet agreed to do all that Great Britain wishes her to do. It seems to me that this is a point to which we should pay our attention.

3. Ambassador CRAIGIE has asked us to exercise restraint over newspaper editorials. I replied to him in a suitable manner, and on the 16th I requested the representatives of the journalistic world to exercise restraint on this subject because of the delicate international situation.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 2-20-41

No. 334

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, Hsinking

February 27, 1941

# 415.

Circular. Received from London as # 135, on the 24th.

At noon on the 24th Prime Minister CHURCHILL invited me to call on him and for one hour we talked together. He traced the history of Japanese-British relations, with which he has personally been in touch since the time of the conclusion of the Tokyo-London Alliance, up through the Russo-Japanese War and the World War. He went into great detail and told me how, as Prime Minister, he is greatly interested in his country's relations with Japan. As his second point, he went on to state: "Relations between our two countries have gradually been growing worse and worse. I am very sorry to see this happening. If our two nations clash, it will be a tragedy indeed. That is just what it will be! Now, our bulwarks principally about Singapore are purely defensive. Great Britain has not adopted the policy of attacking Japan." Further, as his third point he stated: "Let me impress upon you our determination in this war. If all that we hold dear now crumbles to ashes, I rather think that it will be all up with England. I tell the world otherwise but yet I know that this is not going to be any easy war for us. I do not think it will be over this year; nevertheless, I do feel that ultimately we will win. Therefore, I do not think the question of the mediation of another country will be brought up. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA sent Foreign Minister Eden a most cordial message. Mr. Eden is out of the country at the present time, so will you please transmit what I have just told you to Mr. MATSUOKA". Thereupon Mr. CHURCHILL handed me a note containing a summary of his statements contained in separate message # 136 [a]. (I am following this message with one giving the details of this conversation. This is all I am wiring to Washington).

[a] Not available.

Trans. 3-3-41

Page A-201

No. 385

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Hsinking, Nanking, Shanghai, and Peking

February 27, 1941

# 435.

Circular. Message from London # 136, February 24th.

Part 1 of 3 [a].

(Note from Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs containing message to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been laid before the Prime Minister.)

(The Prime Minister is gratified to observe that Monsieur MATSUOKA sees no reason to apprehend any untoward developments in East Asia, and notes with satisfaction his assurance about the peaceful intentions of the Japanese Government.)—(Since Monsieur MATSUOKA, for his part, makes reference to "movements of British and American Governments in their attempt to expedite and enlarge war-like preparations", the Prime Minister would allow himself to offer certain observations which he hopes may remove any misunderstanding of the position of His Majesty's Government.)—(There is no question of His Majesty's Government making any attack upon or committing any act of aggression against Japan, and the Prime Minister is sure that this also represents the intentions of the United States, though of course he cannot claim to speak for them. All preparations which are being made in Oriental regions by Great Britain and the United States are of a purely defensive character, incidentally, the Prime Minister would wish to assure Monsieur MATSUOKA that the concern which Mr. Eden expressed to the Japanese Ambassador was not based exclusively on reports of His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo, but on the course of events in the Far East and on a study of the speeches of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs himself.

[a] See I, 386 for Part 2.

Trans. 3-19-41

No. 386

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Hsinking, Nanking, Shanghai, and Peking

February 27, 1941

# 435.

Circular. Message from London # 136, February 24th.

Part 2 of 3.

(Turning now to the war in progress in Europe between Great Britain and Germany it will be within Monsieur MATSUOKA's recollection that, before outbreak of war, His Majesty's Government made every effort, by concession and reasonable demand, to avert hostilities. That is recognized throughout the world—and indeed, the Government of the day in this country was severely criticized for having traveled too far along this road. Their efforts were unavailing, and the German Government, by attacking Poland after so many breaches of faith and of treaties, chose arbitrament of war.)—(His Majesty's Government, having thus been forced to enter upon this grievous quarrel have no thought but to carry it to a victorious conclusion. Naturally, it takes-some time for the peaceful communities which compose the British Empire to overcome the military preparations of countries which have long been exulting in their martial might and adapting their industries to war production, but even now His Majesty's Government feels well assured of their ability to maintain themselves against all comers, and they have every reason to hope that within a few months they will, with the

Page A-202

rapidly increasing supply of materials which is coming from the United States, be overwhelmingly strong.)—(Monsieur MATSUOKA makes allusion to help from the United States of America. The Prime Minister would observe that that help is being given for the very reason that the battle which this country is waging is for the overthrow of a system of lawlessness and violence abroad, and cold, cruel tyranny at home, which constitutes the German Nazi Regime.)

Trans. 3-15-41

No. 387

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Hsinking, Nanking, Shanghai and Peking

February 27, 1941

# 435.

Circular. Message from London # 136, February 24th.

Part 3 of 3.

(It is this system that the people of the British Empire, with the sympathy and support of the whole British speaking world, are resolved to extirpate from the continent of Europe. His Majesty's Government have no designs upon the integrity or independence of any other country, and they seek no advantage for themselves except the satisfaction of having rid the earth of a hateful terror and of restoring freedom to the many insulted and enslaved nations of the European continent. This they would regard as the greatest honor that could reward them, and the crowning episode in what, for the Western world, is a long continuity of history.) (Monsieur MATSUOKA, with loftiest motives, has hinted at his readiness to act as the mediator between the belligerents—the Prime Minister is sure that, in light of what he has said and on further reflection, Monsieur MATSUOKA will understand that in a cause of this kind, not in any way concerned with territory, trade or material gains, but affecting the whole future of humanity, there can be no question of compromise or parley.) (It would be a matter of profoundest regret to His Majesty's Government if by any circumstances Japan and this country were to become embroiled, and this not only because of their recollection of the years during which the two countries were happily united in alliance, but also because such a melancholy event would both spread and prolong the war without, however, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, altering its conclusion.) (Foreign Office, S.W.) 1-(-----) (the February) (date).

Trans. 3-19-41

No. 388

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

February 28, 1941

# 438.

Circular. In 4 parts—complete. Action London as # 063.

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs acknowledges the receipt of the note of His Britannic Majesty's Prime Minister dated February 24, 1941, and takes pleasure to apprise the latter that the statements and remarks contained therein have been duly noted.

The Foreign Minister trusts that Mr. Churchill is not necessarily expecting observations to be made upon them. He wishes, however, to take advantage of the opportunity to state that no hint whatever of his readiness to act as mediator between the actual belligerents was in-

Page A-203

tended to be conveyed in his memorandum addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (Nor) did he ever imagine of any possibility of such a hint to be read into any part of the text.

The Foreign Minister took occasion in his memorandum to refer to the mediation now taking place in Tokyo as Mr. Eden had made allusions to it and incidentally took the liberty of stating in a general and abstract manner the views he has always cherished, in order to make clear the aspiration and attitude of his country concerning the problem of peace or the recovery of normal conditions throughout the world.

The Foreign Minister believes that it will not be entirely out of place to reiterate what he has said on more than one occasion in reference to the Tripartite Pact, inasmuch as this matter was touched upon by Mr. Eden in his conversation with Ambassador Shigemitu. The Tripartite Pact was concluded as and remains a peace pact in the sense that it was entered into largely with a view to preventing a third Power from participating in the European war or Sino-Japanese conflict, thus limiting the participants and dimensions of the war and also to bringing about peace at the earliest possible date.

Japan's ideals were epitomized in the preamble of the Pact and it is needless to say that Japan is remaining absolutely loyal to the aims and ideals enunciated, will always find herself standing by her allies under the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign Minister would equally deplore and regret, if by any untoward circumstances Great Britain and this country were to become embroiled, not only because of the recollection of the years during which the two countries were united in alliance, but also because such a tragic eventuality would be fraught with the danger of destroying modern civilization to the undoing of the best part of Humanity. February 27, 1941.

Trans. 3-10-41

No. 389

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador)

TO: Washington

March 10, 1941

# 35.

Message to Tokyo # 171. Part 1 of 3 [a].

Re my # 154 [a].

On the 3rd of March Australian Premier MENZIE who is here in the War Cabinet made a speech and in my interview of the 4th, Prime Minister CHURCHILL took it upon himself to refer to it. CHURCHILL avoided using the word "appeasement" and chose a French word "detant"  [sic] which means a slackening of strained relations. In this speech MENZIE answered in a manner Your Excellency's first message to EDEN and proposed that difficulties in the Pacific be overcome through the frank exchange of opinions. It emphasized the importance of friendly relations with Japan.

There was a meeting of the Foreign Press Association, the British and American reporters, together with a number of foreign reporters and other well-known people, had taken their seats, and in response to a wide appeal this speech was made. MENZIE stated that Japan sent influential Mr. KAWAI as Minister to Australia to match Australia's appointment of Sir J. G. LATHAM, and went on to eulogize these emissaries. In response to this speech, labor representatives in the Australian Government charged that this was an appeasement policy, and the opposition here in London also made an ado over it, but MENZIE resolutely denies their accusations and has published a statement that this is not an appeasement policy to placate anyone little by little, but is a realistic policy designed to do away with difficulties. On the 6th

Page A-204

the Australian Government announced that its views differed in no wise from those of the Premier.

Well, I think that we can take this speech of MENZIE's as a gesture of friendship from Great Britain who earnestly desires peace in the Pacific Ocean. The tone of the newspapers since then has also led me to this conclusion.

[a] Parts 2 and 3 not available.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 3-13-41

No. 390

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo

11 March 1941

# 138.

(Abstract)

The British Ambassador said as follows:

Neither the U.S. nor England desire trouble in the Far East, but if the worst comes to worst the U.S. will back up England. According to newspapers, the situation has eased somewhat in the Far East but it is still threatening.

Trans. 3-13-41

No. 391

FROM: Tokyo

TO: London

April 5, 1941

# 116.

Very secret. Re your # 227 [a].

Your suggestion seems reasonable, and we would like to have you continue negotiations on the basis of Britain's proposal. We are giving study to a suggested revision to their plan, and will cable it as soon as it is finished ----- break in the negotiations -----.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 4-8-41

No. 392

FROM: Havana (Nanjo)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

January 25, 1941

# 004.

A message sent from this office to the Consul at Bombay on the 14th (57 words, in the same code as this message, with the address and this minister's name in English) was seized by the censor in India on the grounds of code messages being prohibited. We have protested through the telegram company, but to no avail. Please take the matter up from your office.

Trans. 1-28-41

Page A-205

No. 393

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)

TO: London (Japanese Ambassador)

13 February 1941

# 043.

On the 8th, Yamasita Steamship's Yamafuji was stopped by a British armed merchant vessel at the entrance to the Gulf of Persia. All mail was removed. Representations have been made to British Ambassador.

Trans. 2-25-41

No. 394

FROM: Manila (Nihro)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

April 21, 1941

# 225.

(Abstract)

For the past year British authorities at Hongkong have been examining all mail carried on vessels touching Hongkong. This had delayed delivery considerably and some mail has failed to reach us. Therefore, please notify the Ministry of Communications to avoid vessels touching Hongkong, when sending mail, etc.

Trans. 5-2-41

No. 395

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)

TO: Tokyo

February 22, 1941

# 162.

To be handled in Government Code.

Recently the following personal dialogue took place between myself and HOFSTRAATEN [a]. I endeavored to put him aright on points in which he lacked sufficient understanding but am reporting what was said for your information.

ISIZAWA: "Lately Australian and Netherlands newspapers have been reporting rumors of an impending crisis between Japan and the United States. Since there is no reason for thinking that a clash between the two nations is imminent I am at a loss to understand wherein lies the real meaning of these reports."

HOFSTRAATEN: "We cannot view the situation as optimistically as you. Japan has placed soldiers in French Indo-China and is also doing a lot of fussing around in Thailand. It is hard to believe that her power will not be extended south of French Indo-China and that it will not only become a threat to Singapore but to the Dutch East Indies as well. England and America cannot be expected to remain blind spectators to all of this, and it is herein that the possibility of a Japanese-American conflict lies."

ISIZAWA: "Japan's demands upon French Indo-China and Thailand are being conducted through peaceful and diplomatic negotiations and for this reason England and America have no occasion for objecting. Anyway, the American fleet is not yet strong enough to attack Japan and this is another reason why no war is possible."

HOFSTRAATEN: "No, you are badly mistaken there. I am satisfied from what I have heard from American naval officers that they could sink the Japanese navy within six weeks."

ISIZAWA: "On the contrary, I have been told by Japanese navy men that in the event of an attack our ships could sink the entire American fleet within two weeks."

Page A-206

HOFSTRAATEN: "Well, all that is beside the point. By the time Japan begins to directly threaten Singapore her supply lines from other places will be cut off and, moreover, the United States will stop all her exports to Thailand and Japan. You may be sure that the Dutch East Indies, too, know which side of the bread their butter is on and will hardly fail to adopt the same course. When all this happens it will not take a long time for poor-in-resources Japan to collapse."

ISIZAWA: "Japan's power of resistance is not as weak as you think, and if she finds out that the Dutch are working hand in hand with England and America her policy toward the Dutch East Indies will become extremely severe."

[a] Assistant to the Director of Economic Affairs, N.E.I.

Trans. 2-28-41

No. 396

FROM: Bangkok (Futami)

TO: Tokyo

February 24, 1941

# 129.

Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.

We have found a way to secure the secret documents and messages sent from the Netherlands Ministry here in Bangkok which we believe should be of considerable interest. Therefore, in order to translate these, please dispatch a secretary who understands the Dutch language to serve full time in this office. If that is impossible, send one here temporarily.http://Louissheehan.BraveDiary.com

Trans. 3-1-41

No. 397

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Bangkok

April 24, 1941

# 222.

Strictly secret outside the department.

To be handled in Government code.

Re my # 167 [a].

According to an unimpeachable report, as a result of a secret investigation recently carried on by the Netherlands Ministry in Bangkok, it was found that a native employee of this ministry had possession of keys to all the safes and was in contact with the Japanese Military Attaché. A British Attaché in Bangkok has made a telegraphic report of these facts so, for the time being, please stop the schemes we had afoot.

[a] Tokyo tells Bangkok telegraphic clerk IT O will leave Tokyo on the 5th in order to transmit intelligence received directly.

Trans. 4-26-41

Page A-207

No. 398

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo)

TO: Tokyo

January 17, 1941

# 25.

Part 2 of 3 [a].

Referring particularly to marine industry among other industries, HO [b] said: "I would like to have your attention called particularly to the following three points:

(1) Not only among the officials of the government but also among the people at large, what the Japanese fishermen along the Dutch East Indies Coast have been doing for the last several years has caused a great deal of antipathy.

(2) Setting aside the question of our attitude in time of peace, today, when in a total war declared against Germany and when martial law is in effect over the entire Dutch East Indies, we are unwilling to allow more Japanese fishermen to come to these shores.

(3) We, in the Dutch East Indies, want to encourage fishery among the natives and thus enable them to increase their food supply and for this reason we would like to reserve all profitable fishing zones for their use."

In response to this, ISIZAWA emphatically stated: "You cannot contribute towards improvement of the economic relations between the two countries by digging up instances from the past. Now, if the authorities would concede to the wishes of the Japanese Government regarding fishery conducted by Japanese fishermen in the Dutch East Indies waters, the Japanese Government will in earnest take up the work of educating the fishermen and overseeing them so that no questions will come up between them and the Dutch East Indies authorities. Although the Dutch East Indies are under martial law, they are not facing the danger of war; and furthermore, are not the Japanese fishermen at present engaged in their work without causing any question to arise? Since we are not unwilling to avoid competition with the native fishermen, there is no reason for objecting to our wishes."

The question of communication:

HO pointed out that since there is a powerful wireless telegraph and telephone system between Japan and the Dutch East Indies, he could not see any necessity of laying a cable line between these two countries. ISIZAWA explained: "What the Japanese Government is planning to lay is a cable line which has the highest efficiency in transmission of telegram, photographs, etc., and which does away with function in a new way with an efficiency all the shortcomings of the radio. Furthermore, it will function in a new way with an efficiency several times greater than the radio and would be very necessary in promoting both friendly relations and economic cooperation between the two countries. In fact, the Dutch East Indies also will greatly benefit from such a cable system."

[a] Not available.

[b] HOFSTRAATEN, Assistant to the Director of Economic Affairs.

Trans. 1-22-41

No. 399

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)

TO: Tokyo

January 10, 1941

# 32.

Re my # 22 [a] and # 29 [a].

As police surveillance and control by the N.E.I. authorities over our nationals here is steadily increasing, as you predicted in your successive reports, I plan to destroy the secret documents

Page A-208

relating to our schemes for the natives and Chinese residents (including wires) gradually. I would like to take all precautions, if worse comes to worse, for any eventuality. Please wire your answer to this.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 1-11-41

No. 400

FROM: Batavia (Harada)

TO: Tokyo

January 10, 1941

# 1.

Strictly Secret.

To the Head of the Intelligence Section from the Military Attaché.

Save in the case of open mail, the Netherlands India officials are practicing censorship of all letters. Letters marked "in care of" addressed to people who are supposed to have diplomatic immunity under the Consulate General are in no case excepted. None will escape. So will you please impress this upon all the staff and advise them to send anything secret which they have to transmit by trustworthy couriers.

Trans. 1-13-41

No. 401

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)

TO: Tokyo

January 17, 1941

# 48.

The officials of the Dutch East Indies Government are strictly censoring not only communications from the Islands to Japan (communications of every sort, including telegrams and letters), but also those being sent from Japan to the Islands, although they make an exception (?) of matters for diplomatic offices such as Consulates and for Consuls, for the Japanese representatives at the Japanese-Dutch East Indies negotiations and for the offices of these delegates. In fact, they are censoring all mail matter, giving for their pretext the fact that martial law has been declared. They are examining those being exchanged not only between Japanese, but also between foreigners, and thus they are watching the activities carried on by the Japanese residents. This is, indeed, disadvantageous to us. It is necessary, therefore, to call the attention of the Japanese people at large by publishing this fact suitably in the Japanese newspapers, (however, without mentioning the fact that this report originated at this office).

Furthermore, it seems to me that it would be well for us to censor all communications exchanged between Japan and the Islands not only by the Japanese but by foreigners.

Will you please arrange to have the Foreign Office inform our intelligence officials in Manchukuo and China as well as our officials in offices having to do with South Seas affairs?

Trans. 2-10-41

Page A-209

No. 402

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Berlin

March 8, 1941

# 219.

To Secretary FURUUCHI from Consul ADANI in Batavia as follows:

Since the Dutch East Indies censorship is very strict, please tell the official in charge and HE to send communications addressed to me by courier.

Trans. 3-11-41

No. 403

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)

TO: Tokyo

January 2, 1941

# 5.

From the 4th we plan to begin general intelligence work. Has there been any change in wave length? Please let me know immediately.

Trans. 1-4-41

No. 404

FROM: Soerabaja (Kohri)

TO: Tokyo

March 14, 1941

# 105.

According to a news report, wireless communication stations have been established recently in South Borneo at the following places: Pangkalanjoen, Sampit, Koealakapoeas, Mocaratewe and Poeroektjaoe.

These stations, together with the ones in Tanahgrogot and Kotobaharoe, make a total of seven. All these stations are understood to make use of Bandjirmasin as a relay station.

Trans. 4-5-41

No. 405

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

February 25, 1941

No number.

(Abstract)

Authorities here are watching closely the activities of the Japanese. In order to avoid misunderstanding, please send civilian couriers only hereafter and discourage military men from contacting our diplomatic offices.

Trans. 3-4-41

Page A-210

No. 406

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

April 17, 1941

# 301.

Regarding my message # 149 [a].

Persons connected with other departments are still being dispatched here as diplomatic couriers. So far, every one of these persons has been easily spotted as a military man, from the way he spoke and conducted himself. Furthermore, as most of them do not know foreign languages, it has caused no end of embarrassment and worry to our officials who stood by while they were being questioned by Immigration and Customs officials and some of these couriers have wasted away several days still carrying documents entrusted to them, thus deepening the suspicion of the Netherlands Indies authorities. If a stop is not put to this situation, I am certain that, eventually, the Netherlands Indies government will take steps to prevent the entry of our couriers altogether, thus disrupting tremendously this consulate's service. In spite of this, if it is necessary to continue to dispatch these persons, please take extreme care in selecting the candidates and explain to them, beforehand, the risks they must take as couriers.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 3-4-41

No. 407

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

April 5(?), 1941

# 150.

(In 2 parts—complete).

Re your # 77 [a].

(1) Your suggestion that we sort of make the best of things now, waiting for the international situation to take a new turn is all right as far as it goes, but the attitude of the Dutch is entirely under the influence of Britain and the U.S. ----- America's assistance to Britain -----. If things continue as they are now, they will become more and more confident of victory and stiffen their attitude toward Japan. Then again if by long chance the international situation does not work out entirely as you expect, this attitude will be further stiffened and in view of the situation I mentioned in my # 125 [b], we feel that it would be the wisest thing to come to an agreement as early as possible. ----- (3 lines garbled [a] ----- nothing to do about it. But to needlessly postpone a settlement might lead to a request from the Dutch that negotiations be discontinued, and also with delay in the negotiations, it is easy to imagine the cropping up of various other unexpected problems. As it is, we have not made any suggestions of out-and-out concessions by the Dutch. The conversations have continued to be merely a tug-of-war between Ishizawa and Hofstraaten. We need pay no heed to any of the rumors that are afloat in certain third party nations, but it would be too bad if we should be ashamed of any attitude that we deem to be right and just. The reason we left the preliminary negotiations entirely with Ishizawa is that Ishizawa is better suited than I to discuss the points that are based upon technical knowledge, and though spoken of as preliminary negotiations, they are negotiations that come within his responsibility, and an understanding was had with Vice Minister Ohashi on this matter. The proposed settlement mentioned in my # 125 [b] is not a proposal that the Dutch position be followed as is, but our proposal was drafted as a pretext, which, if we could

Page A-211

agree upon this much, would prove a basis upon which, as our real power is perfected, we can put through step by step such demands as we shall deem necessary in the future, in regard to enterprises for which we should seek entry into the country.

(2) The reason for placing the emphasis upon the purchasing of commodities is fully recognized, and we had Ishizawa tell Hofstraaten that the attitude that the Dutch take toward this main problem might well prove the occasion for friction between Japan and the N.E.I. The Dutch claim that Japan's pro-German attitude of late, especially Foreign Minister Matsuoka's speeches in Berlin and Rome, have made it very evident that Japan is at last coming out with positive assistance for Germany and that therefore it has been decided that it is not sufficient merely to try to prevent N.E.I. commodities that are exported to Japan from being re-exported to Germany, but that also sanction can no longer be given for the export to Japan of commodities which can be used to substitute for goods which are imported from other countries and then sent to Germany.

It is therefore feared that the Dutch will further enlarge the list of articles on which restrictions will be placed on exporting to Japan. This represents the exports ----- Germany in Europe and is no change, but a strengthening of it, and I think there is no longer any possibility of changing the attitude of the Dutch by verbal argument, and I earnestly hope that the government can become convinced of the determination of the colony's leaders. But as long as I do not know your attitude in the matter of my # 141 [c], we can do nothing about pushing ahead with the negotiations; therefore please reply at once.

(3) In regard to item three in your reference message above: I think it natural that the military should desire to have the departure postponed as long as possible, but the Dutch will not be expected to put up with our representatives staying on here ----- day after day. If it is felt that there are no prospects now of coming to an agreement, it goes without saying that their departure will be requested, and for us to have to comply with this would truly be a disgraceful thing. As a matter of fact no allusion was made to this in November of last year when urgent requests came frequently from Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and the Army Minister also had not a word to say about it, and I cannot understand why at this time resumption of negotiations for a settlement of the question of the continued presence of military agencies should be further delayed.

[a] Premier Konoe urges the Jap Minister in Batavia to speed up a settlement of the commercial question in Batavia for the procurement of the materials and not to imitate at this time that a compromise will be accepted in the negotiations for entry of Jap enterprises. Settlement of this question can be carried along until the international situation clears up.

[b] The N.E.I. government will cooperate with Japs on improvement of air lines between Bangkok, Saigon, and other points; improvement of telegraphic communication between N.E.I. and Japan, and assist in facilitating coastal navigation.

[c] In discussion with Hofstraaten over trade negotiations, Ishizawa charges the N.E.I. with cooperating with U.S. and Britain in an economic embargo against Japan which is denied by Hofstraaten with the statement that N.E.I. policy is to assist in defeating Germany by shutting off sources of essential supplies.

Trans. 4-10-41

Page A-212

No. 408

FROM: Batavia (No signature)

TO: Tokyo, (Gaimudaijin)

April 7, 1941

# 272.

To Vice Minister Ohasi.

1. Recently I had the opportunity to speak with IRENBURUGU, an old friend of mine, who is an exceedingly influential person in governmental circles due to his holding the post of political adviser to the Governor and who is the Chief of the Secretariat.

We exchanged views on the recent development of world affairs and on Japanese-Netherlands East Indies relations. The following is the gist of what IRENBURUGU had to say, after stressing the fact that they were entirely his own personal opinions. (Please exercise every precaution against leakage to the press).

a. There is no doubt whatsoever (he said) that the war in Europe would be won by Britain. The Dutch people no longer consider the subject of who is going to be the ultimate winner as the main question. They know that under Hitler they would not have an independent country with freedom for the people. They are united in their determination to fight against such a condition even if that means death.

b. The British are sincere in their desire to cooperate in reconstructing the home country of the Netherlands after the war is over. I, for one, place complete faith in the British in this respect. However, if by some chance, the British fail us—double-cross us—I am among those many Dutch who will not hesitate to take up arms against the British just as is being done against the Germans.

c. I am one of those persons who has always viewed Japanese spirit and culture with respect and admiration. At the same time, I see nothing in the basis of the economic relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies which should offer insurmountable difficulties. However, the European war itself and Japan's attitude with regard to it, are leading Japanese-Netherlands East Indies relations to the brink of disaster.

d. If it were clear that the goods desired of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan were for domestic consumption and domestic consumption only, the N.E.I. government would not have to think twice about complying with Japan's request. However, the Netherlands East Indies cannot at this time permit Japan or any other country to export N.E.I. goods to Germany. At the same time, she cannot condone the exporting of N.E.I. goods to Japan or to any other countries to permit the release of those countries goods for transportation to Germany.

e. It is indeed very regrettable that Japan has allied herself with Germany. Now that Foreign Minister Matsuoka, breaking all precedents, has gone on a visit of Berlin and Rome, he has given expression to Japan's intention of all-out aid to Germany. In view of such an attitude on the part of Japan, it is extremely difficult to foresee the resumption of smooth relations between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan in the near future.

f. In these difficult times the Dutch are very glad the Chief Delegate Yosizawa has been sent here and that you have been reappointed to this post as Consul General. Much had been expected by the officials as well as by the general public of your efforts. However, with everything moving in the direction that it is, I, myself, cannot think of anything which may relieve the tension and have a favorable effect on our relations.

2. Usually, IRENBURUGU is a mild mannered man of even temper. However, when, in our conversation, the subjects of Netherlands-German relations, exporting of N.E.I. goods to Japan, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka's speeches in Europe, came up he shook all over, his face turned red, and in other ways gave every indication of extreme excitement.

The other day Hofstraaten said that if Japan demands goods of the Netherlands East Indies whose destination is Germany, and even if Japan at the same time threatens to use force

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against the Netherlands East Indies if her demands are not met, the Netherlands East Indies would still refuse and resign herself to her fate.

He even went so far as to say that the Netherlands East Indies is determined to pursue a course which she believes to be the right one, and has absolutely no intention of deviating from it.

From these above instances as well as from other cases with which I have come into contact, I form the opinion that the Netherlands East Indies has definitely determined her policy. Her attitude toward Japan has become stronger of late and indications are that it will be continually strengthened as time goes on. I cannot believe that they will ease up on this attitude through any minor developments in the European war.

For my part, I have been pointing out to one and all, that the Tripartite pact does not in any way obligate Japan to aid Germany and Italy vigorously as may be seen by the terms contained in the Pact.

(Just prior to my departure from Japan for my post I discussed this matter with Foreign Minister Matsuoka. At that time we decided to stick to this line of argument).

Chief Delegate Yosizawa and I agreed that we would pursue this line of argument in the preliminary discussion for the trade negotiations. At the same time, we have strived to show the Dutch that a close relationship between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan would be mutually advantageous.

The Dutch had agreed with us in that respect up to a certain point.

However, the visit of Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the Axis powers gave the impression to the Dutch that it was Japan's intention to form closer ties with the Axis powers; that Japan intends to go a step closer to Rome and Berlin than was required under the Tripartite Pact. They believe that Japan intends to aid Berlin more vigorously, and from this belief they refuse to be shaken.

No one can any longer get persons of the Netherlands East Indies to lend an ear to an agreement between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan.

The situation has become so acute that there is a danger that we shall find ourselves unable to purchase even the goods which are looked upon by us as exceedingly important, if we rely solely on world developments to change conditions.

In other words, if the correction of our relationship with the Netherlands East Indies is looked upon with importance, our gesture of aiding Germany is harmful.

If softening of the Netherlands East Indies attitude toward Japan was expected to result by strengthening our ties with Germany, we were mistaken.

What is the recent attitude of our home office on these delicate points? Please advise me by cable immediately. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 4-11-41